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1
In the implicit contract literature ﬁrms act as insurers for their employees: risk-averse
workers get insurance against income ﬂuctuations in that wages are not linked to changes in
productivity (see Rosen, 1985, for a survey).
Principal-agent models stress instead the role of incentives in determining the optimal
compensation scheme, starting from the consideration that the interests of ﬁrm and workers
rarely coincide. Workers enjoy leisure, and this may come at the expense of the ﬁrm’s
performance. If workers’ actions in the workplace were perfectly observable it would be easy
to devise ways of inducing them to produce the amount of effort agreed upon in a contract. But
actions are only partially observable, or observability may require costly monitoring. A ﬂat
compensation scheme, while offering perfect insurance, removes any incentive for the worker
to exert effort. One way to create proper incentives is to link compensation to the ﬁrm’s
performance. However, such risk-sharing has a cost, as it requires paying workers a premium
that increases with their risk aversion. Thus, providing incentives curtails insurance.
Thetrade-offbetween incentives and insurancein theﬁrm-worker relation has received a
great deal of attention in the theoretical literature and is at the heart of modern contract theory.
Much progress has been made in studying the design of incentive contracts under a variety of
theoretical situations (see Gibbons, 1998, for a recent survey). Substantial progress has also
been made in confronting some of the implications of the theory with the data, with two main
strands: one attempting to measure whether incentives actually improve ﬁrm performance, the
second aimed at testing the structure of the insurance-incentive model. Prendergast (1999)
offers a thorough account of the empirical achievements.
Most of the empirical literature to date has been concerned with executives’
compensation (see, for example, Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Margiotta and Miller, 2000).
1 This paper is part of the EU-TMR research project “Specialisation versus diversiﬁcation: the microeco-
nomics of regional development and the spatial propagation of macroeconomic shocks in Europe”. The Italian
“Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca Scientiﬁca” and the “Taube Faculty Research Fund” at the Stanford
Institute for Economic and Policy Research provided ﬁnancial support. We thank Cris Huneeus, Marcel Jansen,
Tullio Jappelli, Ed Vytlacil, Sevin Yeltekin, and seminar participants in Salerno, Turin, the Bank of Italy, the So-
ciety for Economi Dynamics 2001 meeting and the 2001 North-American conference of the Econometric Society
for useful discussion and comments on a preliminary draft, and Antonio Alonzi, Antonietta Mundo and Salva-
tore Giovannuzzi of INPS for supplying us with the data on workers’ compensation. The views expressed in this
paper are our own and do not involve the Bank of Italy or the EU. We are responsible for all errors.8
However, if one is interested in assessing the insurance role of the ﬁrm in the labor market, it
is unlikely that CEOs provide a proper benchmark. First, CEOs and executives are in general
a tiny fraction of the labor force. Second, they are a highly self-selected group of low risk
averse (or perhaps even risk loving) workers who probably have only marginal interest in wage
insurance. In contrast, little is known about the effects of incentive/insurance arrangements
on lower-ranking workers’ compensation. Yet incentives within the ﬁrm are not conﬁned to
managers. As is remarked by Lazear (1999), “there are many workers that a ﬁrm wants to
be motivated”. The use of bonuses and premiums related to the general conditions of the
ﬁrm, possibly with different intensities for different types of workers, is common, as are more
traditional payment mechanisms tied to individual output (such as piece rates).
Inthispaperwe studytheroleofthe ﬁrm as an insuranceprovider. Wetest theinsurance-
incentive trade-off in a context where various types of workers and ﬁrms interact, relying on
matched ﬁrm-employee data available over a long period of time for Italy.
We start from the observation that if incentive/insurance considerations are important
in shaping the relationship between workers and ﬁrms, then they offer testable implications
for the observed compensation scheme. First, the model predicts that ﬁrm performance and
workers’ compensation move in parallel. Second, and more interestingly, it predicts that the
amount of insurance varies with ﬁrms and workers characteristics in ways that are typical of
agency models and are not shared by other schemes of workers compensation. The wealth of
information of our data set allows us to measure most of these characteristics (e.g., workers’
risk aversion or ﬁrm performance variability), and to verify if their effects on the compensation
scheme are consistent with the predictions of the model. As we shall see, our results lend
support to the agency model as a better representation of the compensation scheme than
alternative models, such as the standard spot model with or without frictions and the implicit
contract model.
Our study contributes to the empirical literature in several respects. First, since we base
our analysis on a representative sample rather than a speciﬁc type of workers and ﬁrms, we can
drawmoregeneral conclusions on the relative importanceofinsuranceand incentives. Second,
wecanstudyhowinsurancecoveragevarieswithtypesofﬁrmandworker; thisallowsustotest
some direct implications of the basic incentive/insurance model and help discriminate between
the agency model and the competitive model with or without frictions. Third, since our data9
cover a span of years, we can study whether insurance provision is sensitive to the temporary
or permanent nature of shocks. This issue has received little attention in the empirical as well
as in the theoretical literature. However, it is plausible that the extent to which shocks are
passed on to wages depends on their degree of persistence.
2 For instance, it may be that only
transitory shocks to output are absorbed by the ﬁrm, while permanent shocks are shared, at
least partially, with workers. Insofar as both types of shock are present, ignoring the distinction
may bias the results towards insurance or incentives, depending on the relative importance of
the transitory and permanent components. Fourth, our methodology allows for wage shocks
that are unrelated to ﬁrm performance. Thus, we can compute how much of the observed
earnings variability can be traced to workers sharing ﬁrms’ risk and how much to idiosyncratic
shocks to wages; while the former can potentially be insured within the ﬁrm, the latter are
unlikely to be insurable. Finally, we propose a novel identiﬁcation strategy that can also be
applied to analogous problems arising in different areas of research.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we review the insights of the
standard principal-agent model. In Section 3 we characterize our empirical approach to the
problem, considering a stochastic speciﬁcation for ﬁrm performance and workers’ earnings.
We show that, in the spirit of the principal-agent model, if worker compensation is related
to ﬁrm performance, a set of orthogonality conditions obtains that can be used to answer a
number of empirically relevant questions. In particular, one can examine whether shocks to
ﬁrms’ performance are passed on to wages, and to what extent this is affected by whether
the shock is transitory or permanent. Section 4 discusses how identiﬁcation of the parameters
of interest can be achieved. Section 5 describes the matched ﬁrm-worker data set used in
the empirical analysis, and Section 6 presents the estimation of the stochastic model of ﬁrm
performance and workers’ earnings. The main empirical results are presented in Section 7,
where we focus on the estimates of the incentive-insurance trade-off for the total sample and
then examine the implications of the agency model for the sensitivity of wages to performance.
Section 8 discusses the results and contrasts our ﬁndings with the implications of perfectly
competitive models with and without frictions. Section 9 concludes and traces directions for
further research.
2 One paper weareawareofthataddressesthispointtheoreticallyisGovindaraj andRamakhrishnan (2000).
They show that the sensitivity of the agent’s payment to ﬁrm performance increases with the persistence of the
latter (see their Proposition 2).10
2. The standard principal-agent model
Labor market theories have different predictions concerning the relationship between the
variability of earnings and that of ﬁrm output. In the competitive model with inﬁnitely elastic
labor supply curve, price-taking ﬁrms choose employment to equate the marginal product of
labor to the market wage. According to implicit contract models, risk-neutral ﬁrms insure risk-
averse workers against ﬂuctuations in levels of activity. As a consequence, in both models the
wage paid is orthogonal to ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks.
3 In principal-agent models, by contrast, moral
hazard considerations lead ﬁrms to link wages to performance. Under a series of assumptions,
the sensitivity of the workers’ pay to performance depends on many factors, including the
noise in measured performance, the marginal cost of effort, the elasticity of performance to
effort and risk aversion (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987). The differing implications that these
models have for the compensation scheme allow us to design an empirical test to discriminate
among them.
As noted, empirical studies so far have focused on the consistency of speciﬁc
compensation contracts - such as those of CEOs - with the predictions of incentive models.
Overall, the ﬁndings broadly support the predictions of the theory: for the groups under study,
compensation responds to performance, implying that less than full insurance is offered (see
Rosen, 1992, for a comprehensive survey of empirical studies of CEOs’ compensation). Our
goal is to assess whether incentive models of wage determination help predict the structure
of compensation for an array of workers that goes beyond the limited groups that have
attracted interest thus far. In addition we want to distinguish between transitory and permanent
ﬂuctuations in ﬁrm performance. As far as we know there has been no attempt to test the
general applicability of the principal-agent theory of compensation and to relate it to the
dynamics of the ﬁrm’s performance.
To provide a framework for the subsequent empirical analysis, consider the following
standard, one-period model. Firm performance is given by:
y = z + f(e)+ε (1)
3 The two models differ in their predictions concerning lay-offs. For example, following a negative shock,
in the competitive model some workers areﬁred, while in the implicit contract model they are temporarilylaid-off
but receive a payment that equates the utility of those working and those laid-off (Rosen, 1985).11
where ε ∼ N(0,σ2) is a random shock, z denotes a predictable component that depends
on observable characteristics of the ﬁrm (such as location, industry, size, etc.), e is an
unobservable (to the ﬁrm) component that depends on the worker’s effort or action, and f
represents the sensitivity of performance to effort.
Following Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), assume that risk-averse workers receive a
stochastic compensation that is the sum of aﬁxed component, a, that may vary with observable
workers’ characteristics (education, experience, etc.) and a variable component that depends
on the performance of the ﬁrm, i.e. a bonus tied to output y:
w = a + by (2)
Firms maximize proﬁts π = y − w, while workers maximize utility u(w − c(e)),w h e r e
c(e) is the disutility of effort in wage units. Holmstrom and Milgrom show that if utility is of
the CARA type, i.e. u(x)=−1




where ρ = −
u00(.)
u0(.) is the coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion and c00(.) the curvature of the
agent’s effort function, which is assumed to be convex; thus c00 (.) > 0. Consider the special
case in which f0(e)=1 . If workers are risk-neutral, ρ =0and they bear all risks. In this case
b =1 . Risk aversion makes it worthwhile to reduce the impact of risk on wages (b<1); under
full insurance, b =0 . In the general case, the greater the marginal response of performance
to effort f0(e), the higher b. Note that if a ﬁrm employs workers with different preferences
(ρ and c(.)) or different impact on performance (f), then we should expect different contracts
to be offered accordingly. Finally, note that the sensitivity of workers’ compensation to ﬁrm
performance declines with output variability: ∂b
∂σ2 < 0.
The predictions of this model are the basis of our empirical tests. The model suggests
that the amount of insurance offered within the ﬁrm, parameterized by b, varies in predictable
ways with workers’ risk aversion, their propensity to shirk and the variance of the shocks to
ﬁrm performance. Our aim is to recover an estimate of b and check whether the factors that
theory indicates as relevant to determining the extent of insurance are important empirically.
Note that in both the frictionless spot model with inﬁnitely elastic labor supply curve and the12
implicit contract model of the labor market, b =0 : the compensation of workers who remain
with the ﬁrm is unaffected by idiosyncratic shocks to the ﬁrm’s performance. The distinction
between the models is in employment dynamics; our study, however focuses only on the wage
relationship.
4
3. Shocks and insurance: modelling the stochastic structure of ﬁrms’ performance and
workers’ earnings
The principal-agent model of the previous section offers a highly stylized
characterization of wage contracts. When taken to the data, however, various adaptations
are needed.
First, ﬁrm performance can be measured in several ways. The market value of the
ﬁrm is perhaps the best measure, but it is only available for listed ﬁrms. In this respect,
sales, proﬁts and value added are more appealing proxies; here, we elect value added, but
we examine the sensitivity of results using the alternative gauges. Second, the ﬁrm-worker
relationship is dynamic. In dynamic agency models there may be an additional source
of variability in output: the agent’s ability or permanent component, assumed to be time-
invariant (i.e., a random effect) in the simple principal agent model. This is utterly restrictive,
as ability may evolve stochastically over time (say, due to learning on both sides of the
employment relationship), which suggests a more appealing random walk speciﬁcation. We
incorporate this important feature in our empirical model. Third, in its bare form the agency
model assumes that wage variability can only be explained by the combination of strength of
incentives and output variability. With full insurance or no variability in performance, wages
should evolve deterministically. However, there may be additional sources of unexplained
wage variability that have nothing to do with the pay-performance relation.
5 We augment
our wage speciﬁcation to account for this. Fourth, in accordance with previous empirical
4 The optimal static model has no place for terminations, and, accordingly, we examine the insurance role
of the ﬁrm without considering them. In reality, the risk of losing one’s job is a major source of uncertainty,
implying that ﬁrings should play a role in an optimal incentive scheme. Theoretical results on this issue are still
limited, given the analytical challenges that an optimal dynamic incentive model with dismissals presents. Using
computational techniques, Sleet and Yeltekin (2000) show that, even in the presence of dismissals, wages will be
linked to performance and thus used as an incentive device; they show that the basic predictions of the simple
static principle-agent model carry over to this more general setup.
5 For example, part of vector a in (2) could be unobservable to the econometrician even though perfectly
observable to the ﬁrm (unobservable human capital components, measurement error, etc.). In this case one would
record unexplained wage variability even in the absence of a contractual relationship between earnings and ﬁrm
performance.13
studies (Blanchﬂower, Oswald, and Sanfey, 1996; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999), we use
total compensation as the empirical counterpart of the wage in equation (2). Finally, departing
from the theoretical model of the previous section, we consider a compensation scheme that is
linear in logarithms, rather than levels. This has the advantage of ﬁtting earnings and output
data better. We now turn to the statistical characterization of the model.
3.1 Firm performance
Consider thecasewheretheunanticipated componentof(log)ﬁrmperformance contains
a permanent component ζjt whichfollowsa random walk process, and atransitorycomponent,
vjt, which is serially uncorrelated. Permanent shocks may capture non-mean-reverting
unanticipated technological changes, changes in management or changes in the organizational
structure of the ﬁrm, while mean-reverting transitory shocks are more likely to be associated
with ﬂuctuations in demand. The ﬁrm can distinguish between transitory and permanent
shocks but cannot determine whether they are due to pure chance or to workers’ effort. In
accordance with the basic model, the likelihood of bothshocks may depend on workers’ effort.
For example, effort may inﬂuence performance permanently when the ﬁrm is trying to secure
a new contract or develop a new product, and in a transient way when it is an input of a
static production function. While partly neglected in the theoretical literature, the distinction
between persistent and transitory shocks is important from the point of view of the optimal
wage contract. On the one hand, it may be optimal for a risk-neutral ﬁrm to insulate workers
from transitory ﬂuctuations in output; on the other hand, it is less obvious that the ﬁrm will be
prepared to supply insurance against permanent shocks.
We model ﬁrm performance according to the following stochastic process:
A(L,p)yjt = z
0
jtθ + εjt (4)
where j and t are subscripts for the j-th ﬁrm at time t, A(L,p) is a lag polynomial of order
p ≥ 0 (i.e. A(L,p)xjt =
Pp
τ=0 ατxjt−τ,w i t hα0 ≡ 1), yjt is a measure of observed ﬁrm
performance, such as the logarithm of proﬁts, value added or output, zjt a vector of observable
attributes, εjt the stochastic component of ﬁrm performance, and θ and A are parameters to be
estimated. We assume that the stochastic component of ﬁrm performance has the following
structure:
εjt = ζjt + vjt (5)14
ζjt = ζjt−1 + ujt. (6)
Equations (5) and (6) decompose the disturbance into a transitory component, vjt, and a













v for all t. Weassumethat thetwo shocksvjt andujtareserially
uncorrelated and uncorrelated with each other. This structure (and subsequent identiﬁcation
strategy) can be generalized to the case where vjt is serially correlated (for instance it follows
an MA(q) process).
3.2 Workers’ earnings
Consider now workers’ compensation. The standard principal-agent model described
above assumes that the only source of unanticipated ﬂuctuations in wages is variability in
the ﬁrm’s performance. In reality, ﬂuctuations in individual compensation depend also on
individual idiosyncratic shocks (i.e., shocks that are unrelated to unanticipated changes in ﬁrm
output, such as a spell of illness affecting productivity on the job). From a purely statistical
point of view, another source of random variation in wages is measurement error.
We generalize equation (2) as:
wijt = a
0
ijtδ + byjt + ψijt (7)
where the subscript i stands for the i-th individual and wijt is the logarithm of worker
compensation.
6 The term aijt denotes a vector of systematic factors that affect individual
i0s compensation, which can vary across workers, ﬁrms and time, while ψijt is the stochastic
component of earnings, which is unrelated to the ﬁrm’s fortunes. These idiosyncratic shocks
are meant to capture unanticipated ﬂuctuations in individual ability, shocks to productivity
(such as illness), idiosyncratic changes in labor supply (child-raising, family labor supply
effects, etc.).
6 W el e te a r n i n g st od e p e n do nc o n t e m p o r a r yﬁrm performance, i.e. assume that wages adjust immediately
tochangesinperformance. Inpractice,wagesmightadjustwithalag(thinkofovertimeorbonusdecisions,which
are usually taken at the end of the calendar year). Nevertheless, if adjustments are made at a frequency higher
than a year (say, a quarter), annual data of the type used here will not detect deviations from the contemporaneous
adjustment assumption.15
Let us assume that idiosyncratic earnings shocks are in turn the sum of a permanent
















µ for all t. The two shocks are serially uncorrelated and uncorrelated with
each other at all leads and lags.
Taking ﬁrst differences of (5) and (7), and using the stochastic structure outlined above,
we get the following system of two equations:
A(L,p)∆yjt = ∆z
0





jtbθ + bujt + b∆vjt
+A(L,p)ξijt + A(L,p)∆µijt (9)
where λ = A(L,p)δ. For the purpose of this paper it is more convenient to deﬁne
ﬁrm performance and earnings growth after adjusting for observable ﬁrm and worker
characteristics, i.e.:
∆εjt = ujt + ∆vjt (10)
∆ωijt = bujt + b∆vjt + A(L,p)ξijt + A(L,p)∆µijt (11)
where, from equations (8) and (9), ∆εjt ≡ A(L,p)∆yjt−∆z0




Under our hypotheses, the serial correlation properties of ∆εjt are well deﬁned: since
it follows an MA(1) process (an assumption conﬁrmed by the empirical analysis below),
autocorrelations at the second or higher order are all zero. On the other hand, the serial
correlation properties of∆ωijt dependon theorderpofthelagpolynomial A(L,p).I ng e n e r a l ,
∆ωijt will follow an MA(p +1 )process. The restrictions on the variance-covariance matrix
of ∆εjt are standard and are reported below in the simple case of covariance stationarity:
7 In this context, an idiosyncratic shock to earnings is a purely individual innovation, i.e. it is not shared by













for |τ| > 1
(12)
This simple structure has the obvious advantage that one can identify the variance of the
transitory shock and that of the permanent shock to ﬁrm performance using only information




8 Measurement error makes this identiﬁcation strategy no
longer operational; however, as we show later, given the administrative nature of our data, it is
reasonable to assume that measurement error is negligible both at ﬁr ma n da tw o r k e rl e v e l .I ti s
straightforward to show that the presence of classical measurement error in ﬁrm data increases
the estimate of σ2
v but has no effect on that of σ2
u.
9
In equation (11) it is implicitly assumed that wages respond equally to transitory and
permanent shocks to the ﬁrm’s performance, i.e. that the b coefﬁcient is the same for the
two shock components ujt and ∆vjt. Yet we can test whether the amount of insurance varies
with the temporary or permanent nature of the shock. Let bu and bv denote respectively the
different response of wages to permanent and transitory shocks. We can distinguish various
insurance regimes depending on the values of bu and bv. The contemporaneous covariance
between shocks to performance and shocks to wage growth has the following structure:
E (∆εjt∆ωijt)=

    



































=0for all s,t. For simplicity, we have also assumed covariance
stationarity. If workers are fully insured against ﬂuctuations in the performance of the ﬁrm,
8 In fact −E (∆εjt∆εjt−τ) identiﬁes the variance of the transitory shock σ2
v with |τ| = 1 for all t, while
E [∆εjt(∆εjt+1 + ∆εjt + ∆εjt−1)] identiﬁes the variance of the permanent shock σ2
u for all t.I f t h e r e i s
covariance non-stationarity, then the expressions −E (∆εjs∆εjs+1) and E [∆εjs(∆εjs+1 + ∆εjs + ∆εjs−1)]
identify the variance of the transitory shock and the variance of the permanent shock at time s, respectively.








r for |τ| = 1,b u tE [∆εjt(∆εjt−1 + ∆εjt + ∆εjt+1)] still identiﬁes the variance of the permanent shock
σ2
u.17
the contemporaneous covariance between shocks to performance improvement and shocks to
wage growth is zero and full insurance obtains against shocks of any nature. On the other
hand, if workers share part of the ﬂuctuations, without distinguishing between short-lived and
durable shocks, equation (13) equals b(σ2
u +2 σ2
v),w h e r eb = bv = bu. We call this case
“homogeneous partial insurance”. This is likely to arise if ﬁrms are unable to distinguish
between transitory and permanent shocks. Three other cases may arise. The optimal contract
may result in a different reaction to shocks of different nature. For instance, workers may
bear a substantial portion of the ﬁrm’s permanent shocks but a limited portion of transitory
shocks: in this case, which we call heterogeneous partial insurance, the contemporaneous
covariance equals buσ2
u +2 bvσ2
v. Two special cases occur when workers bear only transitory
shocks but are insulated from permanent shocks (“permanent full insurance”, characterized by
E (∆εjt∆ωijt)=2 bvσ2
v) or bear permanent shocks but are insured against transitory shocks
(“transitory full insurance”, and E (∆εjt∆ωijt)=buσ2
u).
Identiﬁcation strategy Without further restrictions, from equation (13) we cannot
separately identify buand bv, nor can we gauge whether bu = bv = b. To see how identiﬁcation
of the relevant parameters is achieved, start from the general case bu 6= bv in (11):
∆ωijt = buujt + bv∆vjt + ϑijt (14)
where ϑijt = A(L,p)ξijt + A(L,p)∆µijt. Subtract bv∆εjt from both sides to obtain:
∆ωijt − bv∆εjt =( bu − bv)ujt + ϑijt. (15)
Multiply both sides by ∆εjt−1 and ∆εjt+1, respectively, and take expectations to yield the two
moment conditions:
E [∆εjt+1 (∆ωijt − bv∆εjt)] = 0 (16)
E [∆εjt−1 (∆ωijt − bv∆εjt)] = 0. (17)
Intuitively, equations (16) and (17) tell us that once one ﬁlters the unexplained
component of earnings growth ∆ωijt by the unexplained component of value added growth
∆εjt (weighted by a factor bv, the extent of transitory insurance), what is left is uncorrelated18
with the past and future unexplained component of value added growth. In an OLS regression
of ∆ωijt on ∆εjt the latter is obviously endogenous because correlated with the right hand side
of equation (15) via ujt.
10 However, the ﬁrst lag and lead of ∆εjt will be valid instruments,
because correlated with ∆εjt (via the transitory component) and uncorrelated with the error
term. At least in principle, all the variables ∆εjt−τ (with |τ| ≥ 1) are uncorrelated with the
error term. However, the instruments that satisfy ∆εjt−τ with |τ| > 1 are uncorrelated with
the current unexplained component of value added growth, if this is an MA(1) process as in
(10). Thus in estimation only ∆εjt−1 and ∆εjt+1 are used as instruments. Equations (16)-(17)
can be used to identify the ﬁrst parameter of interest bv with one overidentiﬁcation restriction.
This can be tested with standard methods.
Identiﬁcation of bu proceeds along similar lines. Start from (14), subtract bu∆εjt on both
sides and multiply both sides by the term (∆εjt+1 + ∆εjt + ∆εjt−1). Taking expectations it
yields the moment condition:
E [(∆εjt+1 + ∆εjt + ∆εjt−1)(∆ωijt − bu∆εjt)] = 0 (18)
Equation (18) identiﬁes the second parameter of interest bu. Similarly to the moment
conditions (16) and (17), the intuition for this is that after ﬁltering the unexplained component
ofearningsgrowth∆ωijt bytheunexplainedcomponentofvalueaddedgrowth∆εjt (weighted
by a factor bu, the extent of permanent insurance), what is left is uncorrelated with an MA(2)
termcentered in ∆εjt with unity coefﬁcients.
11 Thus one can use (∆εjt+1 + ∆εjt + ∆εjt−1) as
an instrument. By identical logic, any other MA term that contains (∆εjt+1 + ∆εjt + ∆εjt−1)
is a valid instrument. For instance,
P1
k=−q ∆εjt+k (for any q ≥ 2) is a valid instrument as
well. It follows that the model can be tested via these additional overidentifying restrictions.
10 It is worth noting that OLS estimation provides unbiased and consistent estimation if bu = bv = b.T h u s
an exogeneity test for ∆εjt can be used to check whether bu = bv = b.
11 To see why this is so, consider equation (14) and rewrite it as:
∆ωijt = bu∆εjt +[ ( bv − bu)∆vjt + ϑijt].
In an OLS regression of ∆ωijt on ∆εjt the latter is endogenous because correlated with the error term (the
term in square brackets) via ∆vjt. However, the variable (∆εjt+1 + ∆εjt + ∆εjt−1) is a valid instrument,
because correlated with ∆εjt (via the permanent component ujt) and uncorrelated with the error term, as
(∆εjt+1 + ∆εjt + ∆εjt−1) equals (ujt+1 + ujt + ujt−1)+(vjt+1 − vjt−2) as can be checked after some alge-
bra.19
In the empirical analysis, we use a set of three instruments (corresponding to q =1 ,2,3). This
gives us two overidentifying restrictions.
Note that in (18) and (16)-(17) different instruments identify different parameters, and
that instruments that are valid in one equation are not valid in the other. Also, note that if
we had shocks to value added in levels (i.e., estimates of εjt), we could have many more
instruments available to estimate bu in (18). In fact, εjt+τ (τ > 1) will all be valid instruments,
as can be easily checked. Finally, the moment conditions derived above are valid regardless of
the covariance stationarity hypothesis, which provides a convenient level of generality.
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In our view, the identiﬁcation strategy proposed in this paper can be usefully
applied to analogous problems confronted in other areas of research. For instance, in
intertemporal consumption choice models of the type considered by Blundell and Preston
(1998), innovations in consumption (the equivalent of ∆ωijt above) are directly related to
the stochastic process of income (if this is the only source of uncertainty in the model). The
popular income process involving permanent random walk plus transitory serially independent
component implies that the consumption innovation adjusts fully to permanent income shocks
(ujt), but only to the annuity value of transitory shocks (vjt). With longitudinal data on
consumption and income it is possible to identify the different response of consumption to
permanent and transitory income shocks using a slightly modiﬁed version of our strategy.
The foregoing is a discussion of the identiﬁcation of the two insurance parameters bu
and bv. To close the circle on identiﬁcation, we need to identify the variances of the shock to
value added growth and the variances of the idiosyncratic component of earnings growth.
As far as the former are concerned, we will use the fact that (in the more general case of














= −E (εjt+1εjt) (20)
12 Our identifying assumption is that measurement error is negligible given the administrative nature of our
data. What if we relax this assumption? The reader can verify that the presence of a classical measurement
error in the unexplained growth of value added (i.e. the fact that the true value obeys the standard relation:
∆ε∗
jt = ∆εjt + ∆rjt) implies that the estimate of bv is biased toward zero while that of bu is unaffected. If the
true bv is zero, however, there is no bias. The problem is one of invalid instruments; to some extent, it is possible
to check measurement error bias by checking whether overidentifying restrictions are rejected in our model.20
and use minimum distance estimation similar to that suggested by Chamberlain (1984) to
obtain the estimates of the parameters of interest. We do this by choosing the parameters
that minimize the distance between the actual moments and the moments predicted by the












u for all t.
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From the autocovariance function of workers’ earnings, we can recover the variance of
the transitory and permanent idiosyncratic shocks to wages. In the simple case where p =0 ,



















if |τ| > 1.
(21)
Conditioning on the estimated values for bu, bv, σ2
u and σ2
v, the remaining two variances
can be identiﬁed. A slightly more complicated expression can be derived for arbitrary values
of p. Again, minimum distance estimation is used to identify the variances.
Before turning to the description of the data, it is worth remarking that the identiﬁcation
strategy outlined in this section is implemented in a series of steps. First, one needs to ﬁlter
predictable components from both ﬁrm performance and workers’ earnings. Since these are
perfectly observable, incentive contracts will not be made contingent on their realizations. The
observables include the autoregressive components (if any), and exogenous characteristics zjt
and aijt. When the empirical exerciseis implemented using standard IV estimation techniques,
the resulting residuals are consistent estimates of the unexplained growth rates ∆εjt and
∆ωijt.
14
The next step is to use (16)-(18) to estimate bu and bv and check whether these are
affected by observable ﬁrm and individual characteristics along the lines of what is predicted
by agency models.
We then calculate the sample analogs of the theoretical autocovariances E (∆εjt∆εjt−τ)
and E (∆ωijt∆ωijt−τ). For more technical details see Appendix B; for a more thorough
13 In the empirical analysis for brevity we report estimates obtained under the assumption of covariance
stationarity. Those obtained under covariance non-stationarity are available on request.
14 A technical requirement for inference to be valid when working with residuals rather than with true dis-
turbances is that fourth moments of both ∆εjt and ∆ωijt exist and are constant across individuals (MaCurdy,
1982).21
discussion of covariance estimation see Chamberlain (1984). Estimated autocovariances are
then used as inputs for the minimum distance estimation of the variances of shocks to value
added and earnings conditioning on insurance/incentive arrangements.
4. The data
We rely on two administrative data sets, one for ﬁrms and one for workers. Data for
ﬁrms are obtained from Centrale dei Bilanci (Company Accounts Data Service, or CAD for
brevity), while those for workers are supplied by Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale
(National Institute for Social Security, or INPS for brevity). Since for each worker we can
identify the ﬁrm, we combine the two data sets and use them in a matched employer-employee
framework.
15 There is a burgeoning empirical literature on the use of matched employer-
employee data sets (see Hamermesh, 2000, for an account).
The CAD data span from 1982 to 1994, i.e. a period that comprises two complete
business cycles, with detailed information on a large number of balance sheet items together
with a full description of ﬁrm characteristics (location, year of foundation, sector of operation,
ownership structure), plus other variables of economic interest usually not included in balance
sheets, such as employment and ﬂow of funds. Balance sheets are collected for approximately
30,000 ﬁrms per year by Centrale dei Bilanci, an organization established in the early 1980s
jointly by the Bank of Italy, the Italian Banking Association, and a pool of leading banks to
gather and share information on borrowers. Since the banks rely heavily on it in granting
and pricing loans to ﬁrms, the data are subject to extensive quality controls by a pool of
professionals, ensuring that measurement error should be negligible.
INPS provides us with data for the entire population of workers registered with the
social security system whose birthday falls on one of two randomly chosen days of the year.
Data are available on a continuous basis from 1974 to 1994. The INPS lacks information
on self-employment and on public employment, which is also excluded from the CAD. As
we describe in Appendix A, the INPS data set derives from forms ﬁlled out by the employer
15 The INPS data set has been used by Casavola, Cipollone and Sestito (1999) to describe the determinants
of pay in the Italian labor markets and by Galizzi and Lang (1998) to test whether quitting patterns depend on
outside employment opportunities. The CAD data set has been used by Guiso and Schivardi (1999) to explore
the impact of information spillovers on ﬁrms’ behavior. To our knowledge, the two data sets have not been used
jointly.22
that are roughly comparable to those collected by the Internal Revenue Service in the US.
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Misreporting is prosecuted.
Given that the INPS data set includes a ﬁscal identiﬁer for the employer which is also
present in the CAD data set, linking the employer’s records to the employees is relatively
straightforward. As in other countries where social security data are available, the Italian
INPS data contain some detailed information on worker compensation but information on
demographics is scant. In particular, the data set reports total earnings and the number of
weeks worked in each year.
Table 1 reports various descriptive statistics for the ﬁrms (Panel A) and workers (Panel
B) present in our sample. Panel A shows the main characteristics for the sample of ﬁrms in
the CAD data set. From an initial sample of 177,654 ﬁrm/year observations, we end up with
a sample of 116,809, excluding ﬁrms with intermittent participation (40,225 observations)
and those with missing values on the variables used in the empirical analysis (20,620
observations).
17
The sample ranges from very small ﬁrms to ﬁrms with almost 180,000 employees, with
an average of 204 and a median of 60. As expected, most of the ﬁrms are in the North
(75 percent). As for the distribution by industry, ﬁrms in the chemical, metal production
and machinery sectors account for more than 40 percent of the ﬁnal sample. Firms in more
traditional productions (textile, food, paper) account for almost 25 percent. Construction and
retail trade take another 25 percent. The remaining 10 percent is scattered in the service
sectors, which, with a high share of self-employment and small ﬁrms, are under-represented
in the CAD data set.
Panel B reports sample characteristics for the workers in the 1974-1994 INPS sample.
We start with an initial sample of 383,985 worker/year observations and end up with 186,715.
Sample selection was made with the explicit aim of retaining workers with stable employment
and tenure patterns. First we excluded those younger than 18 or older than 65 (5,564
16 While the US administrative data are usually provided on a grouped basis, INPS has truly individual
records. Moreover, in the US earnings records are censored at the top of the tax bracket, while the Italian data set
is not subject to top-coding.
17 Additional observations are lost (for both ﬁrms and workers) in the empirical analysis given the dynamic
nature of most of our estimators.23
observations), circumventing the problem of modelling human capital accumulation and
retirement decisions. To avoid dealing with wage changes that are due to job termination
(registration or layoffs) or unstable employment patterns, we excluded workers with part-
time employment, those who change position during a year, and those with multiple jobs
(127,403 observations). For similar reasons, we dropped individuals who worked for less than
12 months (63,347 observations). In this way we isolate the on-the-job aspect of the wage
insurance contract, leaving the consideration of changes in the occupational status to future
work. Finally, we kept only individuals with non-zero recorded earnings in all years (148
observations lost) and eliminated some outliers (808 observations)
18.
Our measure of earnings covers remuneration for regular and overtime pay plus non-
wage compensation. We compute net earnings using the Italian tax code for the various
years and deﬂa t et h e mu s i n gt h eC P I .
19 For workers with intermittent participation we treat
two strings of successive observations separated-in-time as if they pertained to two different
individuals.
Workers in the resulting sample are on average 41 years old in 1991; production workers
account for 64 percent of the sample, 35 percent are clericals and about 2 percent managers.
Males are 74 percent of our sample and those living in the South 15 percent. Finally, net
earnings in 1991 are roughly 25 million lire on average (at 1991 prices and exchange rates,
roughly $17,300), with a median of 23 million ($15,600).
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5. Estimation of the stochastic structure of ﬁrm performance and workers’ earnings
5.1 Firm performance
As a measure of the idiosyncratic shock to ﬁrm performance (ε) we use unexplained
variation in the logarithm of value added at 1991 prices (deﬂated by the CPI). Value added is
the closest measure to the theoretical concept of ﬁrm performance y in the model described
18 An observation is classiﬁed as an outlier if (a) real earnings are below 1 million lire (500 Euro), (2) real
earnings are below 6 million and the growth rate is below -200 percent, or (c) real earnings exceed 100 million
lire and the growth rate is greater than 200 percent.
19 Results are very similar if we use gross income as a measure of earnings.
20 These descriptive statistics can be compared to a representative sample of the Italian population of private
sector workers drawn from the 1991 Bank of Italy SHIW. We ﬁnd that demographic characteristics in the SHIW
are very similar to those in the INPS (in particular, the proportion of males, production workers, clericals and
managers) and average age is the same in the two samples.24
in Section 2. In our view, it constitutes a better gauge of y than gross output or sales, since
it corresponds to the volume of the contractible output that remains once intermediate inputs
have been remunerated (i.e., the sum of pre-tax proﬁts, wages and perks).
21
To identify shocks to ﬁrm performance we proceed along the lines of Section 2. The ﬁrst




where yjt is the log of real value added for ﬁrm j at time t. In the presence of a random walk
permanent component and/or serially correlated transitory effects (for instance, an MA(q)
process), estimates in levels are inconsistent because of a short T problem. Taking the ﬁrst
difference of the data eliminates this problem and yields:
A(L,p)∆yit = ∆z
0
jtθ + ∆εjt. (22)
Also notice that the ﬁrst difference eliminates ﬁrm-ﬁxed effects (if any) that may
inﬂuence the level of the ﬁrm’s output, such as size. Included in ∆z0
jt is a full set of time
dummies, sector dummies, location dummies, year/sector and year/location interactions.
22 The
orthogonality condition that identiﬁes the parameters of (22) in the general case is:
E (∆εjt|Ωt−q−2)=0 (23)
21 When alternative measures of performance (such as gross output or sales) are used, the results are very
similar.
22 Sector dummies are for agriculture and ﬁshery; mining; food and tobacco products; textile and leather
products; paper, wood products and publishing; chemicals and petroleum; primary and fabricated metal products;
machinery and electric/electronics; energy, gas and water; constructions; retail and wholesale trade and hotels;
transport and telecommunications; credit, insurance and business services; and other private services (agriculture
and ﬁshery is the excluded category). Location dummies are for North, Center and South (Center is the excluded
category). By including these dummies we explicitly remove shocks to ﬁrm performance pertaining to a given
location and a given industrial sector at a point in time. In terms of the agency model these components should
not enter the optimal contract, because they can be separated from effort, given that they are common to all ﬁrms
in a given location or sector at each point in time.25
where Ωt−q−2 denotes the information set on which the agents condition. The residual from
(22) constitutes our measure of output on which the payment to the worker should be made
contingent if workers are to share part of the ﬁrm risk.
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We use the IV estimator suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1982), which provides
consistent estimates of the parameters of interest in dynamic panel data models.
24 The results
of the IV regression are reported in Table 2. We assume that p =1and q =0 ,a n d
check whether such restrictions are consistent in the data (see below). A look at the reduced
form shows that these instruments are powerful for identiﬁcation (a p-value on the excluded
instruments below 0.1 percent). We ﬁnd an AR parameter of 0.28 with a standard error of
0.02. Time, area and sector effects are not statistically signiﬁcant; interactions between time
and area and between time and sector, however, are jointly signiﬁcant.
We use the residual of the IV regression above to construct a consistent estimate of
∆εjt. A close examination of the estimated autocovariances (∆εjt∆εjt−τ),r e p o r t e di nT a b l e3
pooling over all years, reveals the absence of any large or statistically signiﬁcant correlation at
lags greater than one, consistent with ∆εjt being an MA(1) process. This can be tested more
formally using the zero restriction test proposed by Abowd and Card (1989). We ﬁnd that the
null that ∆εjt is an MA(0) process is overwhelmingly rejected (p-value <0.0001), while the
null of MA(1) has a borderline p-value of 4.5 percent. The p-value of the test increases slightly
with the order of the MA process being tested. A difference test MA(0) vs. MA(1) rejects the
null (p-value<0.0001), while a difference test MA(1) vs. MA(2) supports the null (p-value 28
percent) and the proposition above that ∆εjt ∼ MA(1). This makes us conﬁdent that in the
estimation of bu and bv below, one need not be concerned about instrument validity, just about
power. Thus one autoregressive lag is sufﬁcient to characterize the predictable dynamics in
the growth rate of ﬁrm value added (alongside the indicators for a given time/sector/location
conﬁguration); there is thus evidence for value added growth being an ARMA(1,1) process.
23 We run the value added regression on a sample of ﬁrms with non-missing values for the variables of
interest (i.e., value added, year, sector and location), irrespective of whether there are workers to match them
with. This ensures that the results for the value added speciﬁcation are not peculiar to large ﬁrms, which are
obviously over-represented in the subset of ﬁrms with matched workers.
24 More efﬁcient estimates can be obtained using the two-step procedure suggested by Arellano and Bond
(1991). This, however, may have severe ﬁnite sample bias, as noted by Blundell and Bond (1999) among others.
We thus resort to a simple one-step estimator.26
Overall, these results suggest that the random walk plus serially uncorrelated transitory shock
speciﬁcation is a reasonable representation of the stochastic component of value added data.
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5.2 Workers’ earnings
For workers’ earnings we consider a logarithmic speciﬁcation of the process (7), in
which the ﬁrst difference of log annual net real earnings is regressed on a set of observable
attributes: a fourth-order polynomial in age, education (here proxied by a set of occupation
dummies), gender, area of residence dummies, and time dummies (the vector aijt). As noted
above, nominal gross earnings are ﬁrst transformed into nominal earnings net of taxes and
social security contributions (using the rules coded in the Italian tax system at each point in
time), and then deﬂated by the CPI to 1991 prices. We use the available data for all workers
rather than just those in the matched sub-sample. Our estimated regression is:
A(L,p)∆lnwijt = ∆a
0
ijtλ + ∆ωijt. (24)
Recall from Section 3 that under our hypothesis, the length of the AR process for ﬁrm
performance carries over to the length of the AR process for workers’ earnings. Moreover,
under the same hypothesis, ∆ωijt is no longer an MA(1) process but an MA(2) process if
p =1 , as we have assessed in the previous section. We thus impose p =1and estimate the
speciﬁcation (24) by IV using the orthogonality condition:
E (∆ωijt |Ωt−3)=0 . (25)
The results from estimating equation (24) are reported in Table 4. The AR(1) coefﬁcient takes
on a value of 0.33, with a standard error of 0.03. The reduced form regression (not reported
here) shows that the instruments have sufﬁcient predictive power: the p-value of the F test is
in fact below 0.1 percent.
25 Covariances tend to decay rapidly even when estimated on a year-by-year basis. This exercise, however,
reveals that a distinctive feature of the data is covariance non-stationarity, in particular around the strong reces-
sionary episode of 1993. This recession was particularly anomalous because it was characterized by a sharp
devaluation and a major tax increase. The former was advantageous only for exporters, while the latter bore on
all ﬁrms. Before 1992, however, stationarity would not be an extremely unlikely characterization of the data. The
full matrix of estimated autocovariances is available on request.27
As in the case of ﬁrms, we use the residual of the IV regression to construct a consistent
estimate of ∆ωijt. We calculate the autocovariances of the latter pooling over all years and
report the results in Table 5.
A thorough examination of the estimated autocovariances of the unanticipated
component of the rate of growth of earnings reveals that there is no large or statistically
signiﬁcant covariance at lags greater than one. This evidence is not entirely consistent with
∆ωijt being an MA(2) process of the form:
∆ωjt = buujt + bv∆vjt + A(L,p)ξijt + A(L,p)∆µijt (26)
as in the modiﬁe dv e r s i o no fe q u a t i o n( 1 1 )w i t hp =1 .
26 On average, the autocovariance of
order zero is 0.016, while the autocovariance of order one is -0.006.
27 Autocovariances of
order higher than two are economically very small (between -0.0005 and 0.0004) and mostly
insigniﬁcant.
Armed with these results we can now recover the implied values of parameters bv and
bu following the procedure described in Section 3.2 and focusing on the matched employer-
employee data set.
6. Shocks and insurance: the estimates
The matched data set includes 39,930 individual/year observations for 8,228 workers
and 4,194 ﬁrms. It is an unbalanced matched panel of ﬁrms and workers. The mean number of
matches (i.e., the number of workers) per ﬁrm is 1.96, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum
of 397 per year. Table 6 reports characteristics for the ﬁrms and the workers in the set. As
expected, the major difference with respect to the full sample is average ﬁrm size, which
is signiﬁcantly greater. The median number of employees is 103 in the matched sample,
compared with 60 in the full sample. Naturally, larger ﬁrms have a greater likelihood of
being matched with at least one of the workers in the INPS sample. Other characteristics (such
26 There are two possible explanations for this. First, σ2
µ =0(absence of a transitory component once the
AR component is removed from 24). Second, a low value of the AR coefﬁcient may make an MA(2) hard to
detect in the data.
27 These are much lower than the estimates for the US using the PSID (Meghir and Pistaferri, 2000), perhaps
reﬂecting the fact that measurement error is less of a problem in this data set.28
as location, industry, and workers’ demographic characteristics), are fairly similar in the two
samples.
We apply the identiﬁcation strategy outlined in Section 4 to recover the parameters of
interest, bu (the sensitivity of earnings shocks to permanent shocks to value added) and bv (the
sensitivity to transitory shocks). In both cases, our estimating equation is:
∆ωijt = β∆εjt + ϑijt. (27)
As explained in Section 4, parameter bv is identiﬁed using ∆εjt−1 and ∆εjt+1 as instruments,
while parameter bu is identiﬁed using
P1
k=−q ∆εjt+k (with q =1 ,2,3) as instruments.
The overidentifying restrictions are tested with a standard J-statistic (generalized Sargan
test). Under the null hypothesis that the model is correctly speciﬁed, J is asymptotically
distributed χ2 with as many degrees of freedom as overidentifying restrictions and is robust to
heteroskedasticityofunknownform. LowvaluesofJ (highp-valuesofthetest)willsignalthat
the model is correctly speciﬁed. The power of the instruments in the reduced-form regressions
i sc h e c k e db yl o o k i n ga tt h ep-value of the F-test on the instruments excluded. Finally, an
exogeneity test for ∆εjt (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) is an implicit test for bu = bv = b.
We also comment on the estimates of the variances of transitory and permanent shocks
to value added (vjt and ujt, respectively) and of idiosyncratic transitory and permanent shocks
to earnings (µijt and ξijt, respectively). In both cases, we use minimum distance estimation
and for simplicity impose covariance stationarity. The resulting estimates can be viewed as
unconditional averages of the underlying (changing) variances. But it is possible to allow for
non-stationarity and still identify the parameters of interest (for brevity, these are not reported










which informs us on how much wage variability is due to workers sharing the ﬁrm’s fortunes.
This turns out to be a useful way to summarize the evidence.
6.1 Main results
Table 7 shows the results of our exercise. The ﬁrst thing to emerge from the table is
that workers’ wages do reﬂect shocks to the ﬁrm’s value added: E(ωijtεjt)=0 .0019 with
a standard error of 0.0002 (Panel B). Moreover, there is a substantial difference in impact
between permanent and transitory shocks: wages do respond to permanent shocks but the
hypothesis of full insurance with respect to transitory shocks cannot be rejected (Panel A).29
The estimated value of bv (which measures the sensitivity of workers’ earnings to transitory
shocks) is economically small (point estimate 0.007) and not statistically different from zero
(standard error 0.0051). The estimated value of bu (responsiveness to permanent shocks) is
0.06, anorderofmagnitudegreater, withasmall standard errorof0.0154.
28 Jointconsideration
of the point estimates and of the standard errors of the two parameters suggests that bu 6= bv.
29
More precisely, while we cannot reject the hypothesis of “full transitory” insurance, “full
permanent” insurance can be ruled out. The J-test of overidentifying restriction has a p-value
well above 10 percent in both cases, which signals that the models are not misspeciﬁed (and
that measurement error bias in the estimation of bv is negligible, see note 12). Instruments’
power is not a concern, as is shown by the low p-value of the F-test in the reduced form
regressions.
Ourﬁndings imply thata10 percent permanentchangeinﬁrm performanceinduces a0.6
percent permanent variation in earnings for those employed at the same ﬁrm on a continuing
basis.
30 To get a sense of the economic signiﬁcance of this effect consider the median ﬁrm
(value added of 3.49 million euro, 103 employees, paying an average salary of 12,409 euro
per year). Evaluated at the sample median, a permanent decrease in value added of 349,500
euro (10 percent) - equivalent to a 3,413 euro drop in value added per (initial) worker - would
permanently lower the earnings of the continuing workers by 203 euro.
Table 7, Panel B, also reports the estimated value of the relevant moments of the shocks
to output and wages. One can notice that while these are lower than for the full sample (see
Tables 3 and 5), they are not dramatically different.
31 Consistently with the estimates of bu
28 There may be some concern due to the fact that we regress wage shocks against ﬁrm shocks, which are
common to all individuals working in the same ﬁrm. Moulton (1986) shows that the effect of common group
errors is to produce artiﬁcially low standard errors in such regressions. We corrected standard errors assuming
that errors are not independent within ﬁrm and ﬁnd that the correction has no dramatic effects: bu is estimated
with a slightly higher standard error of 0.0252, but the associated p-value is still only 1.7 percent.
29 This is conﬁrmed by the result of the exogeneity test conducted on ∆εjt. The test statistic displays a
p-value below 0.1 percent, which rejects the null bu = bv = b.
30 Using gross rather than net earnings produces a slightly higher coefﬁcient of 0.0692, implying less insur-
ance than when net earnings are used. This is consistent with the view that tax progressivity provides implicit
insurance.
31 Forexample,E (∆ωijt∆ωijt)is0.0139in thematchedsampleand 0.0165 inthefullsample; E (∆ωijt∆ωijt−1)
is -0.0055 in the matched sample and -0.0065 in the full sample.30
and bv, as seen before we ﬁnd that the estimate of E (∆ωijt∆εjt) is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant, while that of E (∆ωijt∆εjt−1) is economically minuscule and insigniﬁcant.
To allow for an evaluation of the amount of insurance involved, we use equally weighted
minimum distance methods (EWMD) to estimate the variances of idiosyncratic shocks to
value added and (conditioning on these and the estimated insurance parameters bu and bv)t h e
variances of idiosyncratic shocks to earnings.
32 The estimate of the variance of the permanent
shock to value added, σ2
u, is 0.0229 (with a standard error of 0.0035), while the estimated
variance of the transitory shock, σ2
v, is 0.0334 (with a standard error of 0.0048). These are
both sizeable and imply standard deviations of 15 and 18 percent, respectively.
Next, we estimate the parameters of the idiosyncratic part of the earnings process, i.e.
after ﬁltering the variability that is due to the amount of insurance/incentives provided by the
ﬁrm. Following the discussion in Section 4, we assume that this idiosyncratic part of the
earnings process can be written as:
] ∆ωjt ≡ ∆ωijt − buujt − bv∆vjt = ξijt + %ξijt−1 + ∆µijt + %∆µijt−1 (28)
i.e., ] ∆ωjt follows a composite MA(2) process. In part, the coefﬁcient % will reﬂect the legacy
of the autoregressive process of the value added (see above); in part, however, it will be related
to an idiosyncratic moving average component in earnings. The EWMD-estimated variances
of idiosyncratic shocks to wages are smaller than the ﬁrm counterpart: σ2
ξ, the variance of
permanentshocks, is0.0058(standard error0.0015), whileσ2
µ is 0.0034 (s.e. 0.0011). TheMA
coefﬁcient% in the stochastic process of earnings is negative (-0.16)and marginally signiﬁcant.
The variability in compensation induced by the incentive scheme adopted depends on
buσu (ignoring the reaction to transitory shocks, which is virtually zero, both economically
and statistically), as can be seen from equation (21). Since the overall standard deviation
of the shocks to wage growth is 0.1179, one can infer that roughly 8 percent of the total
earnings variability can be explained by ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk (see the last row of Table 7), while
the remaining component is related to workers speciﬁcs h o c k s .
32 An alternative would be to use a generalized least squares procedure (optimal minimum distance, or
OMD). Our choice is dictated by the evidence presented in Altonji and Segal (1996), who show that EWMD
dominates OMD even for moderately large sample sizes.31
6.2 Insurance and ﬁrm-worker characteristics
As we saw in Section 2 the principal-agent model of wage determination implies that the
response of wages to performance varies in predictable ways with workers’ risk aversion, the
curvature of the effort function, the variance of shocks to ﬁrm performance and the elasticity
of performance with respect to effort. As Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), among others, argue
forcefully, these implications are the most useful for the empirical assessment of the model,
particularly to discriminate it from alternative models that predict a correlation between ﬁrm
performance and worker compensation. We now address this issue directly, using the wealth
of matched employer-employee data at our disposal. In particular, we go beyond the prediction
tested by Aggarwal and Samwick that the sensitivity of compensation to performance should
declinewith the varianceof performanceand consideralso theotherimplications of the model.
In addition, we also consider further predictions coming from generalizations of the basic
principal-agent model that can be tested with our data set.
For workers characteristics, we can exploit outside information on risk aversion derived
from experiments to construct a measure of risk aversion and study its relation with the
level of wage insurance. The degree of insurance might also depend on the occupational
status. In particular, the optimal contract for CEOs and executives should prescribe more
incentives in thelight of the greaterresponsiveness of ﬁrm performance to theireffort. Another
characteristic that may help explain differences in the amount of insurance received is tenure.
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) show that when there are career considerations, i.e. concerns
about the effect of current performance on future compensation, the explicit incentives from
the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement, whose
career concerns are weakest.
Firm characteristics are important as well. The ﬁrst, direct implication of the model is
that ﬁrms with more noisy performance should rely less on incentive schemes and provide
more insurance, a proposition that can be tested by considering the ﬁrm-level variance of
performance. A second set of implications relates to size, which is likely to matter for several
reasons. First, larger ﬁrms have easier access to ﬁnancial markets, allowing them to buffer
shocks, which is likely to make them more willing to provide insurance (i.e., to bear risk).
In particular, larger ﬁrms have easier access to equity capital and can thus transfer risk to
the market. Second, insofar as larger ﬁrms produce multiple goods in multiple locations with32
diversiﬁed processes(or belong toa conglomerate), they might be more willing to assume risk.
Third, the strength of incentives itself may depend on size. If output depends on aggregate
workers’ effort and it is impossible to disentangle individual contributions, the incentive
mechanism becomes less effective as the number of workers increases.
33 These considerations
imply more extensive insurance provisions in larger ﬁrms (i.e., lower bu and bv). However,
smaller ﬁrms should becharacterized by alargervariance ofshocks to output which, according
to equation (3), should imply less reliance on incentive schemes.
34 Moreover, (surviving) small
ﬁrms tend to show a higher growth rate, which allows for a more extensive use of career
promises with respect to monetary rewards to motivate workers. In addition, only large ﬁrms
might be able to implement sophisticated contracts.
35 The effect of size may also pick up the
fact that small ﬁrms can use the threat of dismissal as a more effective discipline device. This
is quite likely, as in Italy ﬁring and hiring rules are much stricter for large ﬁrms. Finally,
using a variant of the standard agency model, Schaefer (1998) shows that the sensitivity of
wages to ﬁrm performance will be increasing with ﬁrm size if the marginal productivity of
effort increases with size more rapidly than the amount of risk faced by workers. Larger ﬁrms
will therefore ﬁnd it optimal to forgo risk-sharing in favor of more powerful incentives. This
discussion indicates that size might be important for insurance provision, but that its effect can
only be signed empirically.
The last prediction we consider is based on an extension of the basic model that
emphasizes the importance of comparative performance to optimize the wage contract (see,
e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987). If shocks to performance are correlated across ﬁrms,
then the uncertainty about the unobservable component of output growth can be reduced by
looking at the performance of similar ﬁrms. An interesting feature of the Italian economy is
the widespread presence of industrial districts. These are groupings of small- and medium-
sized ﬁrms specializing in a particular product and located in a circumscribed area, ordinarily
within a few miles one another. Firms within a district should be better able to extract valuable
33 This can be mitigated by the presence of strong peer pressure. As Prendergast (1999) points out, however,
there is little empirical evidence that peer pressure circumvents free riding in large production units.
34 Jovanovic (1982) presents a selection model that delivers a positive association between size and the
variance of the rate of growth in output. Such predictions ﬁnd widespread empirical support (e.g., Dunne, Roberts
and Samuelson, 1989).
35 For example, FIAT (the largest private employer in Italy) initiated proﬁt-sharing in the mid-1980s in order
to motivate workers and implement Japanese-style production strategies.33
information from the performance of closely related ﬁrms compared to those outside a district,
and therefore rely more on incentives.
To check all the above implications we modify our IV estimation strategy allowing the
sensitivitycoefﬁcients bu and bv to depend on observable worker andﬁrm characteristics. Thus
we estimate by IV:
∆ωijt = β (Xijt)∆εjt + ψijt (29)
with β (Xijt) being linear in the set of individual-ﬁrm variables Xijt (risk aversion, job type,
tenure, ﬁrm size, location in an industrial district, historical variability of ﬁrm performance,
and aconstantterm). This amountsto including interactions ofsuch variables with valueadded
growth shocks, ∆εjt, and augmenting the set of instruments by the interactions of the original
instruments with the relevant worker and ﬁrm characteristics.
36
As far as worker characteristics are concerned, we create dummies for production
workers, clerical workers and managers, and use age as an (imperfect) indicator of seniority.
Risk aversion, however, is not available in the CAD data set. To classify individuals by
risk aversion, we use outside information on a measure of relative risk aversion obtained
from the Bank of Italy’s 1995 Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). The survey
collects data on income, consumption and wealth and several demographic variables for a
representative sample of about 8,000 Italian households. The 1995 wave of the survey elicits
attitudes towards risk. The household head is offered a hypothetical lottery and asked to report
the highest price he would be willing to pay to participate.
37 Following Guiso and Paiella
(2001), we use the answers to obtain a measure of the Arrow-Pratt index of relative risk
36 Our estimates of b(Xijt) are not affected by the relationship between ∆ωijt and Xijt that may happen
to exist in the cross-section. Including main effects has virtually no effect on the estimates of b(Xijt) (results
available on request).
37 Speciﬁcally, respondents are asked the following question: “We would like to ask you a hypothetical
question that we would like you to answer as if the situation were a real one. You are offered the opportunity of
acquiring a security permitting you, withthe same probability of 1/2, either to gain 10 million lire or to lose all the
capital invested. What is the most that you are prepared to pay for this security?”. Ten million lire corresponds
to about Euro 5,000 (or $5,000). Interviews are conducted personally at home by professional interviewers, who
to help respondents understand the question show an illustrative card and are ready to provide explanations. The
respondent can answer in one of following three ways: a) declare the maximum amount he or she is willing to
pay to participate; b) don’t know; c) unwilling to answer.34
aversion for each consumer.
38 Next, we construct a SHIW sample that is comparable to the
INPS sample (people aged 18 to 65, neither self-employed nor working in the public sector),
and run a regression of the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion on attributes that are observed
in both data sets: a cubic in age, net real earnings, dummies for ﬁrm size, industry, region of
residence, occupational status and gender. The R2 of the regression is about 0.2. We retrieve
the estimated coefﬁcients and use them to impute the relative risk aversion of all the workers
present in the INPS/CAD matched data set. The resulting measure is very reasonable and
conforms to prior expectations: average relative risk aversion is 5.03 and the median 4.86.
The index ranges from 1.79 to 20.64.
39 We construct an indicator for high risk aversion (an
imputed coefﬁcient above the cross-sectional median). Using an indicator dummy should
reduce misclassiﬁcation error due to the imputation procedure.
40
As for ﬁrm characteristics, the historical performance variability is measured by the
standard deviation of log real value added over the period observed (from a minimum of 5
to a maximum of 13 years). We also construct a dummy for location in an industrial district
and use a quadratic in log ﬁrm size (number of employees). Using a polynomial in log ﬁrm
size has the advantage that when evaluated at the minimum size observed in our sample (one
employee) the wage-performance sensitivity is zero, which can be thought of as the baseline.
Table 8 reports the results. Column (1) shows the effects of worker and ﬁrm characteristics on
38 Let Zi be the maximum amount consumer i is willing to pay to enter the lottery; ci the endowment and ui
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where E is the expectations operator and x what the agent gains in the favorable state (i..e, x = 10 million lire).











Given that Zi is known, this expression can be recovered for all those who answer the survey question on
the lottery. Relative risk aversion Ri (ci) is obtained by multiplying Ai by individual i’s consumption ci.
39 Our SHIW sample includes 1,919 workers with valid answers to the risk aversion question. The sample
distribution of the degree of relative risk aversion is right-skewed with a median of 5.35; its value ranges from
0.005 to 36.26 but 90 percent of the cross-sectional distribution is comprised between 1.5 and 12.6.
40 Directuseoftheimputedriskaversionvariableinlevelsorlogsgivesqualitativelysimilarresults, although
somewhat less precisely measured.35
the sensitivity of wages to permanent shocks to performance; column (2), transitory shocks.
To check the power of the instruments excluded in the reduced-form regressions, we report
the partial R2 measure suggested by Shea (1997) in the context of multivariate models with
multiple endogenous variables.
We ﬁrst comment on the results reported in column (1). The indicator for high risk
aversion is associated with a statistically signiﬁcant lower sensitivity of wages to permanent
shocks to performance (i.e., more insurance and a lower value of bu). Overall, there is a quite
sizable sensitivity differential due to risk aversion (-0.07). In the same direction, managers
have less insurance than either white collar or blue collar workers (the excluded category).
However, standard errors are high and prevent reliable inference, arguably due to the small
number of observations on such workers (a little more that 1 per cent of the sample). Finally,
we ﬁnd no solid evidence of a relation between tenure (age) and incentive schemes.
In terms of ﬁrms, consistently with the predictions of the basic agency model, those with
higher variability in performance provide more insurance and less incentives: the coefﬁcient is
negative (-0.0338) and highly signiﬁcant. We interpret this as evidence that incentive schemes
are less effective the noisier the relation between effort and performance, supporting one of
the fundamental implications of the theory. Predictions coming from extensions of the basic
model also ﬁnd empirical support. Firms located within a district provide less insurance and
more incentives than others, and the difference is statistically signiﬁcant. This is consistent
with the idea that district ﬁrms can rely on their neighbors to improve the precision of their
inference and according to the agency model this should make it easier to motivate workers
and thus result in less insurance, other things being equal. Size also matters. The pattern of
incentives is increasing and concave with the size of the ﬁrm, a ﬁnding that is not novel to
our study (see Gibbons and Murphy, 1997, for similar evidence).
41 This goes against the idea
that incentive mechanisms are less effective in large production units (perhaps because of free
riding effects), and that insurance is more costly to small ﬁrms.
To get a sense of the results contained in Table 8, consider a 30 years-old, highly
risk-averse production worker employed in a medium-sized ﬁrm (50 employees) located in














, the implied sensitivity increases
with ﬁrm size at a decreasing rate.36
a district, and with a historical performance variability of 20 percent. For this worker, the
sensitivity to ﬁrm permanent shocks is 0.06. For an individual with the same characteristics
−except risk aversion− the coefﬁcient becomes as high as 0.14. For a ﬁrm with the same
characteristics −but a larger standard deviation of, say, 50 percent− the coefﬁcient declines
to 0.05. In line with the predictions of the agency model, changes in worker and ﬁrm
characteristics may thus impart a wide range of variability in bu.
Note ﬁnally that the p-value of the J-test does not point to misspeciﬁcation of the model
(11 percent), and that in all cases the power of the instruments (as measured by the partial R2)
is high enough to allow identiﬁcation of the relevant parameters and to dismiss the possibility
of ﬁnite sample bias and inconsistency.
In column (2) we repeat the estimation exercise for the sensitivity of earnings to
transitory shocks. In accordance with the results reported in Table 7, neither worker nor ﬁrm
characteristics appear to be statistically signiﬁcant. This implies that insurance of transitory
shocks to value added is pervasive involving all types of workers and all types of ﬁrms. The
J-test has a high p-value of 36 percent, which suggests that it is unlikely that the model is
misspeciﬁed due to measurement error. The high values of the partial R2 for the reduced-form
regressions, on the other hand, suggest that the lack of a relation between transitory shocks
and wages cannot be explained by low power of the instruments.
7. Discussion
Our evidence points to three important considerations. First, workers do share the
ﬁrm’s fortunes, at least in part. The unexplained earnings variability that can be attributed
to incentive schemes is nearly 10 percent. Second, while transitory shocks to value added
do not affect wages, permanent shocks are partly transferred to earnings. Finally, our search
for heterogeneity in the sensitivity of earnings to shocks shows that insurance increases with
workers’ risk aversion, declines with the amount of responsibility within the ﬁrm (as measured
by job position), is less for ﬁrms located in an industrial district and greater for those with
high output variability, and is a decreasing and convex function of ﬁrm size. Most of these
results are consistent with the predictions of the agency model but very hard to reconcile with
competitive models of wage determination even when some friction is allowed for.37
Consider a competitive model of the labor market, in which price-taking ﬁrms choose
employment to equate the marginal product of labor to the market wage. Wages should not
respond at all to idiosyncratic shocks to the ﬁrm, which faces an inﬁnitely elastic labor supply
at the prevailing wage. This is the version tested by Blanchﬂower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996),
althoughtheycorrelatewageswithindustryrather than ﬁrmproﬁtability. Ourtestoftheperfect
competition model is less stringent, in that we do let wages respond to industry shocks - as any
competitivemodel of thelabormarket withlimitedmobilityacrossindustrieswouldimply. All
that we require for the perfectly competitive model to hold is that wages not respond to ﬁrm-
speciﬁc shocks, as is implied by competition within the industry. Obviously, this is a much
weaker requirement than the null hypothesis that workers wages do not respond to shocks to
the industry. Rejecting perfect competition using industry data may not be surprising in the
presence of, say, some market segmentation or industry-speciﬁc skills. Thus our results can be
seen as a more robust rejection of the perfect competition model.
As Blanchﬂower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) note, however, the short-run labor supply
might be upward sloping, due to temporary friction. For instance, in the presence of workers’
mobility costs of the type considered by Bertola (1999), ﬁrms face an upward-sloping labor
supply curve. In these models, the responsiveness of wages to idiosyncratic shocks to ﬁrm
performance is determined by the slope of the labor supply curve: the further away from
inﬁnite elasticity, the stronger the implied correlation between performance and earnings.
Thus, one could argue that while the correlation that we ﬁnd between wages and ﬁrm-
speciﬁc shocks is inconsistent with the frictionless, perfectly competitive model, it could
be made consistent with an extended version that allows for some temporary friction. Yet
our evidence is difﬁcult to reconcile with these models as well. Competitive models with
either ﬁring or mobility costs carry direct implications for the response of wages to shocks
of different duration. Speciﬁcally, since adjusting employment rather than wages is relatively
more advantageous vis-à-vis permanent shocks, wages should respond more to temporary than
to permanent shocks, a prediction that is strongly at variance with our empirical ﬁndings.
Apart from this direct evidence, the competitive model fails to ﬁtw i t hs o m eo t h e r
features of our results. First, whereas in principal-agent models the response of wages to
performance depends in predictable ways on well identiﬁed ﬁrm and worker characteristics,
competitive models (with or without friction) have no clear implication of how the correlation38
between wages and ﬁrm performance varies with those attributes. Second, one could argue
that an environment corresponding more closely to the competitive paradigm is that of
industrial district ﬁrms. In particular, ﬁrms are highly similar and employ workers with similar
characteristics; workers’ mobility and search costs are negligible (ﬁrms being located very
close to one another); ﬁrms are small, implying price-taking behavior. Thus, if the competitive
model were valid one should expect lesser sensitivity of wages to performance among district
ﬁrms, since they are likely to have a more elastic short run labor supply. Again, however, this
is the opposite of what we actually ﬁnd.
Overall, we take our results on wage determination to be remarkably consistent with
the predictions of the agency model and inconsistent with competitive theories, not only in
the extreme version characterized by continuously clearing markets but also in more realistic
versions allowing for rigidities in the form of ﬁring or mobility costs.
8. Conclusions
We began by observing that in the principal-agent model there is a trade-off between
earnings incentives and wage insurance against the vagaries of the product market. We offer
empirical evidence on the extent of insurance and incentive provision within the ﬁrm, based
on a matched employer-employee data set that spans almost 15 years, from the early 1980s to
the mid-1990s, in Italy.
The main empirical ﬁnding is that the provision of incentives is not limited to managers
and executives, the two groups on which the empirical literature has mainly focused. We
document the existence of incentives for all categories of employees, including production
and clerical workers. However, while full insurance is provided against temporary shocks,
lasting disturbances to output are only partially insured.
The sensitivity of workers’ wages to shocks to the ﬁrm varies systematically with ﬁrm
and worker attributes. In particular, it is a concave function of ﬁrm size, it is greater for
ﬁrms located within an industrial district, where output is less noisy and information about
workers’ effort is easier to obtain and process, and it is lesser for ﬁrms with high overall
performance variability. Our estimates also suggest that the responsiveness to shocks depends
on the employee’s position within the ﬁrm: managers’ compensation is more reactive than that
of white-collar or blue-collar workers, although estimates are not at all precise. In addition,39
workers risk aversion is negatively correlated with such sensitivity, consistent with the agency
model of wage determination.
These ﬁndings are sufﬁciently robust for us to draw a few conclusions. First, all
workers share at least partly the fortunes of their company, to an extent that depends on their
relationship with the ﬁrm (i.e., position and tenure), and - more importantly from an economic
and statistical point of view - on their preferences (risk-averse workers self-select into more
secure ﬁrms). Second, insurance coverage depends on the nature of the shocks to the ﬁrm: it
is complete when temporary but only partial when permanent. This obviously helps a ﬁrm’s
adjustment when shocks hit. Let us remark that the distinction made here between transitory
and permanent shocks is not found in the theory, nor has been taken into account in previous
empirical work. This can perhaps explain why several studies have found that wages are little
responsive to measures of performance, i.e. that insurance appears to dominate incentives. In
fact, ignoring the distinction between transitory and permanent shocks biases the estimate of
the pay-per-performance coefﬁcient towards full insurance if transitory shocks are more likely
to be insured than permanent shocks (a solid conclusion of our empirical analysis).
42 Third, the
supply of insurance depends on ﬁrm characteristics other than size (a well known fact of the
42 To show this notice that the unexplained component of earnings growth can be written as in equation (26):
∆ωijt = buujt + bv∆vijt + ϕijt
which explicitly takes into account the different nature of the shocks to output and the fact that they may have
a different impact on wages. The term ϕijt reﬂects residual unexplained variation not accounted for by shocks.
Our empirical analysis suggests that bu > 0 and bv =0 .T h u si nt h i sm o d e l∆ωijt = buujt+ϕijt and transitory
shocks to ﬁrm performance do not affect wages because they are smoothed away at the ﬁrm level. Suppose that
the distinction between transitory and permanent shocks is ignored and that a common sensitivity factor bu is
imposed. In this case:
∆ωijt = bu (ujt + ∆vjt)+ϑijt.
Theresidualtermϑijt includesresidualunexplainedvariationnotaccountedforshocks,ϕijt,and−bu∆vjt,
at e r mt h a tr e ﬂects the failure to account for the different sensitivity of wages to shocks of different nature. In
this simple univariate case the OLS estimate of bu has probability limit:









The OLS estimate of bu is therefore downward-biased. The sign of the bias remains negative also when
bv > 0 but bu >b v.40
labor market), such as location within an industrial district, which presumably helps employers
to disentangle random common ﬂuctuations from idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations in output.
Overall, the ﬁrm proves to be an important provider of insurance for individuals. The
average standard deviation of wage growth shocks is about 10 percent while that of shocks to
value added growth is 30 percent; about one-tenth of the wage variability is due to workers
sharing the ﬁrm’s (permanent) risk. If temporary shocks were transferred to workers in the
same proportion as permanent shocks, the variability of earnings would increase by as much
as 15 percent.Appendix
A. The data
A.1 The INPS data set
The Italian National Institute for Social Security (Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza
Sociale) requires ﬁrms to ﬁle a yearly report (form O1M) for each worker on the payroll. The
data are used to estimate the amount of withholding tax the employer has to pay on behalf of
the employees, and to INPS as contributions towards health insurance and pension funds.
This database covers the universe of employees in the private sector (thus excluding
the self-employed, public employees, and off-the books work). Our data set is a sub-sample
of the universe, based on workers born on two particular days of the year; our data refer to
1974-1994. The form reports information on annual earnings and on the number of weeks
worked. Earnings are divided into two components: normal and occasional. Occasional
earnings includes sums drawn from the wage supplementation fund laid-off or short-time
workers, seniority and loyalty premia, one-time bonuses, moving expenses and business travel
refunds, the monetary value of goods in kind, and allowances for lost tips and commissions.
On average, occasional earnings are less than 10 percent of the total. Our measure of gross
income is the sum of the two components.
The data set also has information on job categories, albeit workers with a rough
breakdown: apprentices, production workers, clericals and mangers. Unfortunately,
information on education is missing. From the worker’s social security number it is possible
to retrieve the gender, the year of birth (and therefore age), and place of birth. Finally, the data
set also contains the employer tax code, which allows us to match information on the worker
with that for the ﬁrm.
A.2 The CAD data set
Firm data are drawn from the archives of the Italian Company Accounts Data Service,
which collects balance sheet information and other items on over 30,000 Italian ﬁrms. The
data, availablesince1982 and upto 1996, are gathered byCentraledeiBilanci, anorganization
established in the early 1980s jointly by the Bank of Italy, the Italian Banking Association
(ABI), and a pool of leading banks to build up and share information on borrowers. Besides42
reportingbalancesheetitems, thedatabasecontainsdetailedinformationonﬁrmdemographics
(year of foundation, location, type of organization, ownership status, structure of control,
group membership etc.), on employment, and on ﬂow of funds. Balance sheets are reclassiﬁed
to reduce dependence on the accounting conventions. Balance sheets for the banks’ major
clients (deﬁned according to the level of borrowing) are collected by the banks. The focus
on the level of borrowing skews the sample towards larger ﬁrms. Furthermore, because
most of the leading banks are in the northern part of the country, the sample has more ﬁrms
headquartered in the North than in the South. Finally, since banks mainly deal with ﬁrms
that are creditworthy, ﬁrms in default are not in the data set, so that the sample is also tilted
towards better than average quality borrowers. Despite these biases, comparison between
sample and population moments (not reported) suggests that the CAD is not too far from
being representative of the whole population (with the exception of the over-representation of
ﬁrms larger than 1,000 employees).
B. Covariance estimation
For each ﬁrm in the sample we obtain a consistent estimate of ∆εjt as the residual from















If the ∆εjt observation is missing, it is replaced by zero. Conformably with ∆εj,
deﬁne with dj a vector of 0-1 dummy variables. The dummy is 0 if the observation for ∆εjt
is missing, 1 otherwise. All the autocovariances of the type E (∆εjs∆εjt) are consistently












where F is the number of ﬁrms always present in the data set and ./ denotes an element-by-
element division.43
Deﬁne with m the vector of all the distinct elements of C, i.e. m = vech(C).S i n c eC
is a symmetric matrix, the number of distinct elements in it is
T(T+1)
2 . Conformably with m,
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Thestandard errors ofthe estimated moments are simply the squareroots ofthe elements
in the main diagonal of V. A similar strategy is used to obtain an estimate of V (and
corresponding standard errors) for workers’ earnings.Table 1
Firms’ and workers’ characteristics in the full sample
Panel A: Firms’ characteristics
Mean Median Stand. dev.
Value added (millions of lire) 16,879 3,935 245,773
Employees 204 60 2,353
South 0.0887 0 0.2844
North 0.7485 1 0.4339
Agriculture and Fishery 0.0028 0 0.0527
Mining 0.0054 0 0.0731
Food and tobacco products 0.0485 0 0.2149
Textiles and leather products 0.1225 0 0.3278
Paper, wood products and publishing 0.0931 0 0.2906
Chemicals and petroleum 0.1308 0 0.3372
Primary and fabricated metal products 0.1080 0 0.3104
Machinery and electrical/electronic 0.1934 0 0.3950
Energy, gas and water 0.0027 0 0.0518
Construction 0.0758 0 0.2647
Retail and wholesale trade, hotels 0.1548 0 0.3617
Transport and telecommunications 0.0254 0 0.1572
Credit, insurance and business services 0.0186 0 0.1351
Other private services 0.0182 0 0.1337
Panel B: Workers’ characteristics
Mean Median Stand. dev.
Earnings (millions of lire) 25.49 23.15 11.27
Age 40.52 41 9.88
Male 0.7410 1 0.4381
Blue Collars 0.6393 1 0.4802
Clericals 0.3460 0 0.4657
Managers 0.0146 0 0.1201
South 0.1529 0 0.3599
North 0.6610 1 0.4734
Panel A reports summary statistics for the ﬁrms in our data set; panel B shows descriptive statistics for the sample of
workers. All statistics refer to 1991.Table 2
















Number of observations 74,359
This table reports the results of the IV regression for value added growth, ∆ln(Value added)t. Excluded instruments
are lags of (log) value added dated t − 2 and t − 3. Values in round brackets are asymptotic standard errors; values in square
brackets are p-values.Table 3
The autocovariance structure of shocks to value added























The table reports the estimates and the corresponding standard errors of the autocovariances at various orders of the






















Number of observations 91,575
This table reports the results of the IV regression for ∆ln(Earningst), earnings growth. Excluded instruments are
lags of (log) earnings dated t−3 and t−4. Values in round brackets are asymptotic standard errors; values in square brackets
are p-values.Table 5
The autocovariance structure of shocks to earnings







































The table reports the estimates and the corresponding standard errors of the autocovariances of the unexplained
component of real earnings growth, i.e., estimates of E (∆ωijt∆ωijt−τ). Data are pooled over all years.Table 6
Firms’ and workers’ characteristics in the matched sample
Panel A: Firm characteristics
Mean Median Stand. dev.
Value added (millions lire) 33,966 6,757 320,159
Employees 413 103 3,724
South 0.1098 0 0.3128
North 0.7156 1 0.4512
Agriculture and Fishery 0.0016 0 0.0403
Mining 0.0042 0 0.0649
Food and tobacco products 0.0526 0 0.2234
Textiles and leather products 0.1251 0 0.3309
Paper, wood products and publishing 0.0907 0 0.2872
Chemicals and petroleum 0.1524 0 0.3595
Primary and fabricated metal products 0.1137 0 0.3176
Machinery and electrical/electronic 0.2142 0 0.4103
Energy, gas and water 0.0039 0 0.0623
Construction 0.0562 0 0.2304
Retail and wholesale trade, hotels 0.1183 0 0.3230
Transport and telecommunications 0.0227 0 0.1491
Credit, insurance and business services 0.0221 0 0.1470
Other private services 0.0221 0 0.1470
Panel B: Workers’ characteristics
Mean Median Stand. dev.
Earnings (millions of lire) 26.02 23.81 10.90
Age 40.77 41 9.79
Male 0.7627 1 0.4255
Blue Collars 0.6351 1 0.4815
Clericals 0.3523 0 0.4777
Managers 0.0127 0 0.1118
South 0.1345 0 0.3413
North 0.6750 1 0.4684
Panel A reports summary statistics for the matched ﬁrms in our data set; panel B shows descriptive statistics for the
sample of matched workers. All statistics refer to 1991.Table 7








J-test (p-value) 0.1161 0.3777
F-test (p-value) <0.0001 <0.0001
Panel B
































The ﬁrst row in Panel A reports the IV estimate of the sensitivity of wages to value added shocks (bu for
permanent shocks and bv for transitory shocks). J-test is the test of overidentifying restrictions. F-test is the test of joint
insigniﬁcance of excluded instruments. E (∆ωijt∆ωijt−τ) is an estimate of the autocovariance of wage shocks of order
τ; E (∆εjt∆εjt−τ) an estimate of the autocovariance of value added shocks of order τ; E (∆ωijt∆εjt−τ) an




µ are EWMD estimates of
the variances of value added permanent shocks, value added transitory shocks, wage permanent shocks and wage transitory
shocks, respectively. % is an estimate of the MA coefﬁcient of earnings. Asymptotic standard errors are reported in
parenthesis. The Ratio is calculated as: buσu q
E[(∆ωijt)2]
and measures the amount of earnings variability attributable to
value added shocks.Table 8
The sensitivity of earnings to value added shock: Accounting for parameter heterogeneity
Sensitivity to Sensitivity to

























































J-test (p-value) 0.0851 0.1459
The omitted characteristic is the interaction with “Production worker”. Asymptotic standard errors are reported in
parenthesis; the partial R2 for the reduced-form regression is reported in square brackets (see Shea, 1997). J-test is the test of
overidentifying restrictions.References
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